

**BLOOD ON THE LEAVES / BLOOD ON THE ROOTS: NIETZSCHE,
SCHÜRMAN, AND WYNTER ON RESENTIMENT, BAD CONSCIENCE,
DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS, AND METAPHYSICS AT THE BIRTH OF
THE HUMAN BEING AS PRAXIS AT THE END OF METAPHYSICS**

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Abstract

*This paper sets out to investigate the Nietzschean connection between Sylvia Wynter and Reiner Schürmann through a reading of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Nietzsche's account of 'bad conscience' is read through the Wynterian and Fanonian concept of 'sociogeny' to demonstrate its necessity to Nietzsche's project of the Great Redeemer. This paper, then, demonstrates a previously undiagnosed influence of Nietzsche on Wynter and the role that anarchy plays in her construction of the 'human being as praxis'. The essay concludes with an amelioration of Schürmann's epochal genealogy to account for a racialized lacunae present in his Western genealogy of thought. It is by bringing all three together that we understand anarchy as being firmly committed to anti-racist and anti-anti-Black enactments. It concludes by highlighting the possibility of metaphysics after the withering of epochal archē in what this paper calls 'the multitude of metaphysics'.*

Keywords: Nietzsche, Anarchy, Metaphysics, Anti-Blackness, Resentment

Introduction

This paper sets out into the labyrinth of Western metaphysics with Ariadne's thread of anti-racism to demonstrate how anti-Blackness is the most occult kernel at the heart of Western metaphysics. As such, even those programs like Friedrich Nietzsche's or Reiner Schürmann's remain trapped within the enclosure of metaphysics by their failure to properly engage and overcome this metaphysical trap. As we will see in Nietzsche's corpus, the ill infecting his body making him weak and feverish is the particular form of anti-Blackness evident in modernity. Thus, despite his 'philosophizing with a hammer', Nietzsche still is caught in the labyrinth from which he is unable to escape. Sylvia Wynter's work on the genealogy of anti-Blackness throughout the enclosure of Western thought will be used to clarify and shine a harsh light on Nietzsche's entrapment. As we will see, Wynter's own project helps

advance the non-metaphysical grammar of being through her account of 'the human being as praxis'. This project will be sympathetic, though critical of Schürmann's own account of 'constituting oneself an anarchist'. It is only by becoming anti-anti-Black and anti-racist that something like the 'hypothesis of the closure' will become feasible and possible in the 'age of anarchy' such as the contemporary. This is the task of this essay: the constitute oneself as anarchist and anti-racist.

In the ensuing sections I will focus on Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals* to explicate the ruse of anti-Blackness for which Nietzsche has blinded himself to. By drawing on Schürmann's lectures on *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, we will clarify the anarchist and anti-metaphysical *intent* of overcoming the enclosure. Then, we will turn toward Sylvia Wynter's work to understand how she utilizes Nietzsche's work within her own. This will uncover the little commented upon influence and importance of Nietzsche to her work. Then we will see how the project of the human being as praxis becomes possible on the basis of the sociology of consciousness and our autopoetically instituted definition of what it means to be a human. And, finally, we will show how Schürmann and Wynter's project ameliorate one another and open onto the possibility of cultures of actuality in the multitude of metaphysics. There is much that had to be left out to discuss the path through the labyrinth. And, as such, many paths could spring from the ensuing discussion. I have chosen to focus on a particular path for reasons that hopefully will be clear as the essay unfolds. Let us begin to pick up Ariadne's thread and commence through the maze of modernity through the work of Friedrich Nietzsche.

Nietzsche: Or, how the Slave became Metaphysical, and Anti-Blackness as Ressentiment

In this section, I will argue a two-fold approach: one, in Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morality*, he establishes that metaphysical concepts have their origin, or archē, in moral sentiments/ressentiments which develop out of the master-slave dichotomy, and, two, Nietzsche's anti-Blackness in *On the Genealogy of Morality* is indicative of a remnant metaphysical shard blinding him from understanding his own complicity in metaphysical resentments toward Blackness. The purpose of this section, and the paper writ large, is not merely to say, "ecce

racist!". Others have done so and far better than I ever could¹. Instead, I wish to demonstrate how anti-Blackness, far from being an anomaly or a point to be argued away, is actually constitutive of Nietzsche's 'philosophizing with a hammer' and therefore cannot be so easily eradicated. I will conclude this section by arguing that Nietzsche's account of 'bad conscience' parallels W.E.B Du Bois' 'double consciousness' and, in part, is the progenitor of what Nietzsche writes when he argues for a "great redeemer" of a "great health" (Nietzsche 1989, 96) . This will lead into Wynter's own clarification of the contours of Nietzschean thought through her development of 'the human being as praxis'.

I will be principally focused on the first two essays of *On the Genealogy of Morals* because they provide the most concrete enumeration of Nietzsche's aim in the text, and his anti-Blackness. A far deeper and more engaged reading of Nietzsche's entire corpus for the specificities of his anti-Blackness is possible. Others have done so, and I am merely following in their footsteps. My contribution to this nexus of 'Nietzsche' and 'racism' is merely to demonstrate how constitutive anti-Blackness is to his text, and that it is not an errant prejudice which can be cauterized like a wart on the corpus of Nietzsche's works. Thus, I acknowledge that a great vista encircles my own diminutive project, and from its horizon I commence.

Nietzsche begins *On the Genealogy of Morals* by discussing how certain 'moralists' and 'genealogists' have sought and failed to provide the appropriate origin for certain moral sentiments like the couplet "good and evil" or "good and bad". Nietzsche, then, argues against these writers that we must understand the birth of certain metaphysical sentiments not through a search for truth and veracity, but through moral mechanics of domination and control². For instance, in Nietzsche, it was the birth of "the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradiction to all the low, low-minded common, and plebian" that constituted the origin of our dichotomy between good and bad (Nietzsche 1989, 26). In particular, it was the masters who sought to control and dominate their surroundings through the outward imposition of certain values and characteristics as being 'good'. For

¹ For more see: (Gilman 2007) (Bernasconi 2017) (Conway 2002) (Bernasconi 2017b) (Mubirumusoke 2022) (Scott, Franklin and Gooding-Williams 2006) (Snead 1981)

² Schürmann writes, "that is what *On the Genealogy of Morals* shows: how all forces turn sour under the moral command – and how it is sour life that wills the moral command" (Schürmann 2020, 91)

Nietzsche, this contingent origin of a delineation between good and evil entails that a 'transvaluation of values' is possible because these valuations do not have their origin in the illusion of truth and certainty. Rather, as we will see, these values are capable of being overturned by a certain virulent nihilism which would produce a 'selbstaufhebung' – or self-overcoming – of these values. Thus, the birth of good in the morality of the masters was ultimately issued from a fundamental *indifference* to power. That is, the masters were, for Nietzsche, focused on a certain internal condensation of power; how power could be used and wielded for their own purposes became constitutive of a break between the masters and what Nietzsche sees as an almost logical offshoot of the masters: the slave morality.

The slave was *fabricated*. That is, they were produced by a certain process of 'internalization', or the inability of the slave to externally throw off certain forces and wills to power and truth. Schürmann writes, "subjecting oneself to an ought considered universally valid is the attitude of one type, the slave" (Schürmann 2020, 90). Internalization, as we will see in the creation of bad conscience, is integral to Nietzsche's scalars of will to power and truth. The slave is produced through the process of internalization of the transmission of values by the master, because they were incapable of overcoming these external impositions. For Nietzsche, the slave morality grew out of the priestly caste (Nietzsche 1989, 31-33). This caste, in turn, promulgated these slave moralities on the basis of a certain drive toward internalization that was in stark contrast to the mores of the masters. In some sense, Nietzsche will argue that slave morality is *unnatural*, and anathema to the internal compulsion of life and nature toward a drive toward power. As unnatural, the slave morality *naturalizes* itself over the course of its progression such that it becomes internalized by the individual unconsciously. Thus, for Nietzsche's own project of the genealogy of morality, the slave's condemnation of all that which is in opposition to the master becomes naturalized as truth and veracity. Against this naturalization, Nietzsche's genealogy aims to 'desediment'³ the metaphysical forms which derived from the slave morality, which, for Nietzsche, has come to dominate society.

Schürmann argues that Nietzsche's project of the genealogy of morals is a radicalization of the Kantian transcendental system and aimed at uncovering the

³ I use "Desedimentation" in the sense argued by Dimitri Chandler as a sort of quasi-deconstructive move made to reveal the naturalization of certain metaphysical sentiments. For more on this notion see Chandler 1996.

conditions of possibility for truth and certainty⁴. For Schürmann, this project sought to show how metaphysical truths and values such as 'bad', 'good', and 'evil' became only so on the basis of an 'occult moralization'. Thus, in the fabrication of a slave morality, the *origin* of these mores was a *command*. The slaves were compelled by the originary command to throw off all that was different from them. Archē, or 'command or beginning', rules over the slave morality. It is, fundamentally, an archaic paradigm⁵. Slave morality, instead of embodying the Nietzschean master who wills their own will to power and commands and controls their own lives, the slave is beholden and commanded by the archaic paradigm which sought to impose the values of others as their own values. Thus, a subtle subterfuge occurs wherein the *externalization* of the morality of mores by the masters is *internalized* by the slaves as *their own valuations*. The archaic paradigm naturalizes these commands as the origin of the present sentiment of the slave morality. For Nietzsche, Judea – who embodies the Nietzschean conception of slave morality – has conquered Rome – or the masters; "Rome has been defeated beyond all doubt" (Nietzsche 1989, 53).

Out of slave morality, resentment grows. Principally, resentment, for Nietzsche, names a certain psychic dynamic wherein the internalization of the master's mores produces an external object of fixation and evaluation which fails to treat the external object with a sense of appropriateness. Nietzsche writes, "while every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is outside, what is 'different', what is 'not itself'; and *this* No is its creative deed. ... This *need* to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself – is of the essence of *ressentiment*: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world ... - its action is fundamentally reaction" (Nietzsche 1989, 36-37). That is to say, the object of resentment is clouded by this inability to externalize their own 'transvaluation of values'. Thus, while externalization *does* occur for the slave, it is only in the form of a resentment toward the 'good' or the master. This proto-psychoanalytic language highlights a certain *phusis* of Nietzsche's methodology. Following the archaic paradigm, the resentment of the slave becomes its own bastardized version of the imperative to command latent

⁴ Schürmann writes, "the working hypothesis of this course: Nietzsche brings to an end a very definite way of philosophizing – by doing so he locates himself within this tradition, as its last offspring. This tradition is that of transcendental philosophy as inaugurated by Kant" (Schürmann 2020, 16).

⁵ I borrow this term from Malabou's *Stop Thief!* (Malabou 2023, 13).

in the archē. Thus, the slave morality becomes thoroughly metaphysical in its own imposition of valuations and morality of mores. But the origin of this archē is split between the metaphysical enclosure, and that which exceeds it – we could posit that the anarchic⁶ in Nietzsche lies as a possibility in excess of the metaphysical confines produced by the slave⁷. Ressentiment, then, becomes a defining metaphysical mark of the human.

It is in the second essay – "Guilt, 'Bad Conscience', and the Like" – that Nietzsche continues to elaborate on the psychic dynamics of ressentiment and internalization through the originary figures of the creditor-debtor relationship. For Nietzsche, we can look at the origin of certain phenomena like "guilt" through their etymological origin in the creditor-debtor relationship (Nietzsche 1989, 62-63). It is the *dynamic* between creditor and debtor that marks a certain dynamic which will eventually produce what we understand as 'bad conscience'. Nietzsche's own account of the genealogy of this mental formulation amounts to a speculative anthropology which is illuminating for several reasons. One, Nietzsche seems to imply that society was formed around this dynamic of creditor and debtor and that punishment became a means of 'evening' out the contract when the debtor failed to make good of their end of things⁸. Consequently, second, the ability for the body to register these pains of punishment became a site of fixation in the proto-societal developments. That is, the body became a palimpsest of punishment and acted as a ledger of these sorts of punitive damages. Third, Nietzsche seems to imply that the body's ability of feel pain was historically contextual. That pain was 'felt less' back then, argues Nietzsche (Nietzsche 1989, 68). Thus, instead of the corporeal punishments as a means of retributive justice, punishment became a way of simply registering the failure of the debtor. As he focused in the first essay on the development of the psychological formulations latent in the master-slave couplet, in this essay Nietzsche argues that an internalization of the debtor-creditor relationship produced the phenomenon of the "bad conscience"; "all instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly *turn inward* – this is what I call *internalization of man*" (Nietzsche 1989, 84).

⁶ For more on anarchy and Nietzsche's philosophy see Call 2001.

⁷ For more on anarchy and Ressentiment see Newman 2000.

⁸ "The lawbreaker is a debtor who has not merely failed to make good the advantages and advance payments bestowed upon him but has actually attacked his creditor: therefore, he is not only deprived henceforth of all these advantages and benefits, as is fair – he is also reminded *what these benefits are really worth.*" (Nietzsche 1989, 71)

It is in the second essay that Nietzsche develops what I call the 'occult sensuality of the body'. It is occult because Nietzsche's genealogy is attempting to desediment the naturalizations of metaphysical values as they either dampen or elevate the body's ability to sensually engage with the will to power and life's forces. This 'sensuality' is important for Nietzsche's genealogy of 'bad conscience' because it is the ability of the body to register the punishment of the creditor which determines the mediation between creditor and debtor. Sensuality names the palimpsestic ability of the body to be a ledger of the punishment. If, on the other hand, the body was deadened to these forces of punishment and retribution, then the entire dynamic would collapse on the inefficacy of punishment to meant signify the failure of the debtor to pay back the creditor. Thus, as we will see, Nietzsche speculates on the phylogeny – or the development of an organism over the course of its evolutionary lifespan – of the human body by extrapolating from the present ontogeny – or the development of the organism over the course of its lifetime – of 'bad conscience' and slave mentality/morality. It is the body's sensuality which becomes a text before the genealogist Nietzsche.

Nietzsche writes that "perhaps in those days [...] pain did not hurt as much as it does now; at least that is the conclusion a doctor may arrive at who has treated Negroes (take as representatives of prehistoric man –) for severe internal inflammations that would drive even the best constituted European to distraction – in the case of the Negroes they do not do so" (Nietzsche 1989, 68). This body-as-text, as we see in the midpoint of the second essay, is read by Nietzsche as containing a fundamental ontological split. For Nietzsche, a certain bifurcation occurs between, on the one hand, non-Blackness, and, on the other hand, Blackness. How are we to understand this split? One, Black individuals *do not feel pain on par with the European*. And two, they are representative of prehistoric man, and are therefore distinct from contemporary man. In light of what has already been written, the Black subject is both ontogenetically different than the non-Black and phylogenetically different. Therefore, for Nietzsche, a fundamental ontological split has occurred between Blackness and non-Blackness which would *appear* to be more original than the very split between, say, master and slave, creditor and debtor. Nietzsche relies on the 'prehistoric relic' (of which we will learn more in the next section) to argue that pain was felt *less* back then. The development of the occult sensuality of the body becomes bifurcated along racial fault lines.

Nietzsche discusses the ontogeny of the non-Black body as being more sensitive to pain today than prehistoric times such that "if pain hurts more today, it simply requires a certain sublimation and subtilization, that is to say it has to appear translated into the imaginative and psychical and adorned with such innocent names" (Nietzsche 1989, 68). Nietzsche identifies this process of "sublimation and subtilization" as the process of internalization which is integral to the development of the 'bad conscience'. The ontogeny of the European body reveals a split between it and Blackness which would exclude Blackness from being within the sociality that Nietzsche identifies as founded on the creditor-debtor relationship; "the community, too, stands to its members in that same vital basic relation, that of the creditor to his debtors" (Nietzsche 1989, 71). The ontogeny of the European, then, is predicated on a phylogeny of the European body which develops over the course of history that must come to adapt to the punishment driven society we live in today.

The phylogeny of the non-Black body is Nietzsche's target in the genealogy of bad conscience. This phylogeny reveals that "the feeling of guilt, of personal obligation, had its origin, as we saw, in the oldest and most primitive personal relationship, that between buyer and seller, creditor and debtor: it was here that one person first encountered another person, that one person first *measured himself* against another" (Nietzsche 1989, 70). Thus, from this perspective, the development of the phylogeny of the body in *On the Genealogy of Morality* was predicated upon an anti-Black exclusion of Blackness from the realm of personhood. That is, Blackness was excluded from being included in the creditor-debtor relationship because they could not 'feel' as their non-Black counterparts. This 'feeling' was integral to the development this relationship because it became the measure by which each evaluated themselves against one another. This comparing, the outward comparison of one against the other, is indicative of the dynamic of resentment. Nietzsche writes, "one can see who has the invention of the 'bad conscience' on his conscience – the man of *ressentiment!*" (Nietzsche 1989, 75). We see, then, that Blackness becomes defined, in Nietzsche, by its exclusion from the affairs of 'men'. How so? Primarily, 'bad conscience' and 'ressentiment' are evidence of a phylogeny which is markedly *divergent* from the phylogeny of Blackness. That is, if we recall, since Black subjects *feel less* today, and European man *feels more*, then resentment and bad conscience are predicated upon a phylogeny of *feeling* which Nietzsche takes to be indicative of only the *European* phylogeny, not a Black one.

If Blackness is indicative of a certain prehistory, then we would do well to puzzle over what Nietzsche means when he writes "this prehistory is in any case present in all ages or may always reappear" (Nietzsche 1989, 71). In one sense, I would argue that Nietzsche is pledging for a deepening of the ontological split we have mentioned earlier. Thus, while it is true that something of prehistory maintains itself in the present, this is not the prehistory of Blackness. Instead, Nietzsche advocates for a split between the prehistory that phylogenetically progressed into history, non-Blackness, and the prehistory which never eradicated itself into history, Blackness. For evidence of this, we can see how Blackness as 'pre-historic' signifies *non-civilized* and *non-social*, since it is always *outside* the confines of society. As a deadened, prehistoric body, Blackness was structurally prohibited from being a part of the socializing creditor-debtor relationship, since they lacked the sensuality necessary. Blackness, it would seem, does not even have a history but rather is the absolute limit of history and thus an absolute limit of Nietzsche's genealogy. That is, Blackness becomes what Frank Wilderson III and Saidiya Hartman call "the position of unthought" (Hartman and Wilderson 2003); as the 'position of unthought', Blackness, for Nietzsche, is a phylogenetic limb of European man's history but remains unthought in its specificity beyond racist *Ressentiment*. Blackness, in Nietzsche, is what encircles the metaphysical enclosure of modernity. Thus, without the origin of Blackness, there would be no origin of metaphysics, since Blackness circumscribes the metaphysics which Nietzsche is desedimenting. The beginning, or archē, of Western metaphysics, in Nietzsche's genealogy is a Blackness which is then negated and produced metaphysically as 'anti-Blackness'.

I turn to Calvin Warren's searing work in *Ontological Terror* to identify the metaphysics of anti-Blackness. Anti-blackness, for Warren, is "an accretion of practices, knowledge systems, and institutions designed to impose nothing onto blackness and the unending domination/eradication of black presence *as* nothing incarnated"; or, "antiblackness *as* metaphysics" (Warren 2018, 9-10). Anti-Blackness, then, constitutes a form of *nihilism*. "Thus, calculative thinking ... is a strategy for imposing nothing onto blacks" (Warren 2018, 10). This calculative thinking is the type that Nietzsche identifies as the consequence of bad conscience wherein "that one person first *measured himself* against another [...]; man designated himself as the creature that measures values, evaluates and measures, as the 'valuing animal

as such" (Nietzsche 1989, 70). Anti-Blackness becomes metaphysical in the original command of Western metaphysics to *be* anti-Black⁹. To be anti-Black is to be a *nihilist* about the foundation of meaning in the West. Thus, Nietzsche, in some sense, obeys the originary metaphysical command to be anti-Black. In this sense, then, Nietzsche is offering a *resentful* interpretation of Blackness. If following the metaphysical archē as command is the leitmotif of the slave morality, then Nietzsche too succumbs to this metaphysical evaluation. As resentment, Nietzsche's anti-Blackness is an external prejudice which marks the ontological apartheid established between Blackness and non-Blackness. If we recall, *ressentiment* is a No to all that is *different* than it. Therefore, this partition of philosophy is indicative of an operative gulf between being and non-being, between sameness and difference. Nietzsche's account of anti-Blackness is a function of resentment. Resentment is an artefact of anti-Blackness.

I would like to argue, then, that parallel to Nietzsche's account of "bad conscience" as that which develops out of the internalization of the creditor-debtor relationship with its punitive dimension is what W.E.B. Du Bois called the "double-consciousness" of Black folks¹⁰. This "double consciousness", for Du Bois, develops out of what Wynter would call the sociogeny of what it means to be Black. Sociogeny names the process identified by Frantz Fanon as "along-side phylogeny and ontogeny there is also sociogeny" as integral to the creation of an answer of what it means to be Black (Fanon 2008, XV). Double consciousness is the 'doubled lens' through which Blackness must see itself. "Double consciousness is at once a deprivation (an inability to see oneself except 'through the eyes of others') and a gift (an endowment of 'second-sight', that seems to allow a deeper or redoubled comprehension of the complexities of 'this American world')" (Bois 2007, XIV). Thus, in some sense, double consciousness and bad conscience emerge from a fundamental pairing of their respective worlds kept apart by a partition. Double consciousness emerges from the originary pair of Blackness and Non-Blackness; bad conscience emerges from the originary pair of creditor-debtor. Thus, for both, a certain fiction becomes truth. In Du Bois, the Black subject sees themselves both as who they are in the context of

⁹ And this command is evidence of this logic of measurement and calculative thinking; Blackness is imposed upon as nothing and is measured next to European Man.

¹⁰ This further serves to deepen the ontological divide and apartheid between Blackness and Being.

sociogeny of Blackness, and as a more generalized citizen of the polity. A split occurs wherein, as Du Bois notes in *The Souls of Black Folk*, "a double system of justice [was produced], which erred on the *white side* by undue leniency and the practical immunity of red-handed criminals, and erred on the *black side* by undue severity, injustice, and lack of discrimination" (emphasis mine) (Bois 2007, 121). Bad conscience, on the other hand, emerges out of a sociogeny of slave morality which they internalize. Nietzsche seems to indicate, however, that just as he noted in the development of slave morality that a certain cleverishness accompanies it, so too does a certain possibility at 'great health' accompany bad conscience. This eldritch potential animates both double consciousness and bad conscience.

Sylvia Wynter argues in several essays that Blackness is both an aporia – "this *aporia* I define that *of the secular* – that is as one whose humanly emancipatory process on the one hand, and humanly subjugating process on the other, are nevertheless the lawlike condition of the enacting of the other" (Wynter 1984, 189) – and a site of epistemic clarity. That is, Blackness is capable of seeing the epistemic contradictions of a system because they are the bearer of those epistemic contradictions. Likewise, for Nietzsche, the 'redeemer' who will promise a fundamental 'great health' is conditioned by a certain relationship to that which whom he will redeem. Nietzsche implies that because every sickness is pregnant, the sickness of Western modernity will produce a progeny which will redeem society. The ability of this individual is predicated upon their ability to see with great clarity through the lies of a society of slave morality. That is, epistemic clarity becomes integral to the ability of the anti-Christ redeemer to see through the epistemic contradictions and aporias of our epistemic regimes. Thus, for Wynter, this 'heretic' will likewise open up the possibility of what she calls "the human being as praxis" on the basis of their understanding of what it means to be a human as autopoetically instituting a new genre of the Human. As we will see in the next section, this task of Wynter's dovetails with Nietzsche's own program of 'great health'.

Thus, we may conclude this section by highlighting how Nietzsche's account of slave morality, resentment, and bad conscience all inevitably rely on a sociogeny of self-definition that is simultaneously operative in the creation of slave morality, resentment, and bad conscience, and is also the condition of possibility for becoming a Great Redeemer. In so many words, Nietzsche's *On*

the Genealogy of Morals attempts to overcome the metaphysical archē of society which stand at the origin of our definitions of what it means to be human. Thus, metaphysics becomes capable of being overcome precisely because the process of sociogeny, as we will see in the next section, is capable of being transvaluated on the basis of a human agential capacity. Slave morality, bad conscience, and resentment are *contingent* expressions of a *necessary* process of sociogeny. To throw off these psychical impediments means to see with great clarity the epistemic contradictions of one's own time. Besides phylogeny and ontogeny, sociogeny opens up the possibility of desedimenting metaphysical principles which impel an anti-Blackness that is constitutive of modernity as such. Thus, Nietzsche's sociogenetically constructed resentment towards Blackness is part of the narratologically constructed definition of what it meant to be European. This section sought to demonstrate how Nietzsche's concepts unfold around a tripartite reading of phylogeny, ontogeny, and sociogeny, with the last being occluded as an operative force. Thus, by understanding their triangulation on the human, Nietzsche sought to overcome metaphysics but inevitably remained trapped on account of his anti-Blackness. Quite simply, Nietzsche failed to see through the epistemic contradictions of the aporia of Blackness that we will now extrapolate upon in the ensuing section.

Wynter's Night: Or, Seeing Clearly in Blackness to Envision "the Human Being as Praxis"

This section will approach the work of Sylvia Wynter through Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morality* to expose the following things: 1. How Nietzsche's anti-Black racism is indicative of the 'overrepresentation of the genre of Man2' as *bio-economicus*; 2. How 'conscience' and 'bad conscience' are sociogenetically created through our autopoiesis of the self-instituting codes and norms of behavior which have their parallel in the Du Boisian concept of 'double consciousness'; and 3. How the possibility of the 'human being as praxis' is predicated upon a self-overcoming of our stabilized, otherizing, exclusionary definitions of 'what it means to be human'. When taken together, I will argue, we can better understand not only Nietzsche's project in *On the Genealogy of Morals* but also the occult influence of Nietzsche's thought on Wynter's own

project, of which, there has been minimal discussion¹¹. Thus, this section is both an explication of the relationship between Wynter and Nietzsche and synthesis of their respective projects. We will end with how the 'human being as praxis' opens up the Schürmannian possibility of 'constituting oneself an anarchist' in the contemporary.

Nietzsche's equivocation on the 'prehistoric' representation of Blackness is not an errant prejudice. Instead, as Wynter's work demonstrates, it is indicative of a long tradition of Black abjection. As Wynter argues, Blackness post-1492 becomes the nadir of the racialized hierarchy of the Aristotelian Great Chain of Being in the development of the concept of race caught between the triad of European, Indigenous, and African (Wynter 2003, 300). Wynter writes, "the Renaissance humanists epochal redescription of the human outside the terms of the then theocentric, 'sinful by nature' conception/'descriptive statement' of the human, on whose basis the hegemony of the Church/clergy over the lay world of Latin-Christian Europe had been supernaturally legitimated" was the beginning of modernity post-1492 (Wynter 2003, 263). No longer predicated upon the dichotomy of redeemed and sinful, Man became defined by a ratio-political constitution which argued that Man's rationality was indicative of his privilege in the world. That is, reason and rationality from 1492 till the middle half of the 19th century became the criteria for determining who was to be a citizen of the polis – and thus enfolded into the cloak of being and citizenship – and who was excluded. This epochal constellation of the legitimization of discourse solidified around Man¹ as ratio-politically determined. Likewise, all those determined and judged to be without reason were excluded from the fold of humanity. Wynter writes, they "thereby [were] coming to invent, label, and institutionalize the indigenous peoples of the Americas as well as the transported enslaved Black Africans as the physical referent of the projected irrational/subrational Human Other to its civic-humanist, rational self-conception" (Wynter 2003, 281-282). Thus, for Wynter, beginning in the Foucauldian periodization of the Classical Age of Reason, Blackness became marked as Other and Lack on account of the "overrepresentation of the genre of Man".

¹¹ For instance, in the two collected essays on Wynter's work there is zero reference and mention of the influence of Nietzsche on Wynter. For more SEE: (Bogues 2006) (McKittrick 2015)

Such an 'overrepresentation' was indicative of a dynamic latent in the coloniality of being – or the processes and sedimentation of the category of Being with white, European, capitalist, masculine, able-bodiedness – which sought to collapse phylogenetic difference into a monolith of European hegemony wherein the category of Man was consolidated around one primary figure – European Man. Overrepresentation is "this issue [as that] of the genre of the human[:]; above all, its overrepresentation of its well-being as that of the human species as a whole" (Wynter 2003, 313). Just as Nietzsche argues that Judea conquered over Rome – as slave morality supplanted the master's morality – so too did the European category of Man supplant the possibility of ontological difference between the then emerging nascent categories of race. Thus, at once, Europe had both established a break from the theo-centric hegemony of the Catholic Church, and instituted a new ethno-class as the main referent for the answer of "what does it mean to be human". As we saw in the previous section, a necessary ontological split occurred in the category of the human that allowed the production of a denigrated Blackness, and an apotheosis of European Man¹².

Wynter argues, however, that the epochal referents of ratio-political supremacy would wither in the upheaval of Darwinian evolutionary biology and the ascendancy of Capital. Taking over from Man1, Man2 became to be defined no longer by a supernatural providence of God's divine will and mercy. Instead, Man2 became either 'selected' or 'dysselected' by the natural evolutionary forces of nature (Wynter 2015, 193). Thus, Nietzsche's own account of the will to power as a force of nature and life became normalized in racial discourse of the latter half of the 19th century. Beginning in the Modern Age, Man, still overrepresented as a singular referent, became defined by a biological and capitalist set of criteria. No longer a sign from God of His immaculate bestowal, reason transformed into evidence of European Man's evolutionary selectness by the forces of nature – the will to power – and his preternatural ability to navigate the market. Quite literally, for Wynter, the market became indicative of a certain innate ontogenetic acumen that the Other lacked on the basis of their Lack of Reason. Thus, both evolutionarily dysselected – and thus a relic of prehistory as Nietzsche wrote in *On the Genealogy of Morals* – and economically anachronistic, Blackness in Man2 became

¹² One could argue that the resentment of antagonism to difference is constitutive of the force of overrepresentation, i.e. to overrepresent is indicative of a *ressentiment* by the European male ethno-class.

indicative of their evolutionary 'dysselected' status. Blackness, according to the Modern Age, was both biologically inferior and evolutionarily 'out of time'. Blackness once again served as a liminal category of knowledge. Just as we saw in Nietzsche's metaphysics, Blackness encircles the great domain of Man2 as what is excluded in its inclusion in the definition of *What It Meant to Be Human*.

Returning to Nietzsche, we may see how his comments on Blackness' biological inferiority – their lack of sensitivity to pain – and their representation of humanity's prehistory is perfectly constitutive of the Modern Age's conception of Man2 as a bio-economical model. As Other, Blackness became prehistoric – and thus *non-historical, and thus non-civilized* – in the same way that whiteness became *modern*. These two parallel developments constitute what Sylvia Wynter calls the aporia of secularization. Similarly, Nietzsche's account of the Great Redeemer of Health required the liberation of this new genre of Man at the expense of the abjection of Blackness. Thus, despite his attempts at carrying out a genealogy of the 'morality of mores' which caused the sedimentation of metaphysical principles, he remained beholden to the transcendental referent of whiteness. That is, if, as Schürmann argues in *Philosophy of Nietzsche*, he was carrying out a radical transvaluation of the transcendental system in Kant to dig into the conditions of possibility of truth and knowledge and overcome those conditions through the Will to Power, Nietzsche still could not escape the trap of the overrepresented category of the genre of Man2.

To further the point, it is important to note that anti-Blackness defines the scope of metaphysical principles which are the origin of the originary command, or archē. That is, Nietzsche's anti-Blackness is indicative of a metaphysical remnant which has embedded itself into his eye causing a sort of epistemological and metaphysical blindness to the dynamics of resentment operative in his 'philosophizing with a hammer'. To seek a self-overcoming of metaphysical principles through a transvaluation of all values, but, nevertheless, to remain committed to an anti-Black sentiment is to remain trapped within the metaphysical system he so eagerly believes himself to escape. Nietzsche's genealogy aims at uncovering the conditions of possibility of things like 'bad conscience', 'good and evil', 'truth and lies' but only digs into the shallow bedrock of a false foundation. It is not enough to merely identify the narratological constructions of our metaphysical principles as Nietzsche does. Instead, and this is Wynter's insight, one must realize that these narratives are themselves proscriptive of the values which animate

discourse. That is to say, Nietzsche rightly identified the truth that "the entire universe as the infinitely fractured echo of one original sound – man; the entire universe as the infinitely multiplied copy of one original picture – man" (Nietzsche 2006, 119). What he failed to do, however, was recognize that since Man constructed the universe, as Wynter agrees, so too did he construct the Other to man. I would argue, therefore, that a certain *ressentiment* remains in Nietzsche's own slave morality – a slave to the overrepresented genre of Man. It is *ressentiment* because Nietzsche is measuring himself against Blackness and internalizing this antagonism as indicative of a fundamental ontological difference. For Nietzsche, the anti-Black racism of *On the Genealogy of Morals* reveals a hidden *ressentiment* latent in his prejudice which relies on the very metaphysical principles he is seeking to overcome. However, this does not mean that Nietzsche's work is unsalvageable. In fact, Wynter utilizes *On the Genealogy of Morals* and "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" repeatedly throughout her work. If the measure of a citation's importance is the context it is embedded in, then Wynter's citation of Nietzsche is crucial towards her overall project. Principally, her citation of Nietzsche – and the eight or so times she does so throughout her work¹³ – comes in the form of the following quote from the second essay of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*:

The tremendous labor of that which I have called "morality of mores" – the labor performed by man upon himself during the greater part of the existence of the human race, his entire prehistoric labor, finds in this its meaning, its great justification, notwithstanding the severity, tyranny, stupidity, and idiocy involved in it: with the aid of the morality of mores and the social straitjacket, man was actually made calculable (Nietzsche 1989, 59).

The appearance of this citation, in Wynter, occurs almost always in the context of the discussion of sociogeny and the autopoiesis of self-instituting codes. For instance, in "Toward the Sociogenic Principle", Wynter writes:

it is these schemas and the coercive nature of their systems of meaning that make it possible for each mode of sociogeny and its artificially imprinted *sense of self* to be created as one able to override, where necessary, the genetic-instinctual sense of self, at the same time as it itself comes to be subjectively *experienced as if it were instinctual*; it is thereby enabled not only to reoccupy the formerly hegemonic place, of the genetic self, but also

¹³ A selection of a few places: (Wynter 1984, 25; 2000, 47; 2001, 62fn11; 2015, 226; 1995, 32-33; D. Scott 2000, 128) and an unpublished essay entitled "Human Being as Noun".

to harness its drives to its now culturally defined sociogenetic own (Wynter 2001, 48)

She cites the passage from *On the Genealogy of Morals* in a footnote to the above quotations leading with: "In his *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche made the illuminating point that human life came into existence as the unique form of life that is only due to the 'tremendous labor' that the species was to effect upon itself, through the mediation of the 'morality of mores'" (Wynter 2001, 62fn11). As such, we would do well to unpack this correlation, in Wynter, between Nietzsche and the Sociogenic Principle.

The process of human history, according to Wynter, has been a series of emergences and emancipations of human agency from extraterritorial benefactors. For example, it was the field of astronomy in the early stages of human history which attached agency to the stars and their constellations. This was latter transplanted onto the monotheistic religions with their 'Great Man in the Sky' paradigm of super-agential capacity (i.e. what God willed was the will of the humans, and thus not 'autonomous' subjects as modernity would have it). Eventually, for Wynter, as we already noted with the heresy of the Renaissance Humanism, this agency was eventually placed solely within the human as an autonomous, rational subject who could show their agency through self-description and re-definition. That is, for Wynter, the epochal shift from Classical Age to the Modern one was affected on the basis of a capacity for self-description that she calls the autopoiesis of the self. This self-fashioning of Man was eventually to become fully emancipated from extraterritorial confines and placed solely into Man's hands as a means of biological and economic mediation. Thus, for Wynter, it was our description of ourselves as biological creatures that we began to understand the role of sociogeny in the construction of the answer to "what does it mean to be human?"

For Wynter, the Sociogenic Principle names the Fanonian and Du Boisian insight into the narratologically constructed nature of Blackness as a parallel to that of whiteness through the production of 'double consciousness'. As we noted previously, this double consciousness was predicated upon an autopoiesis of the self which defined Blackness in opposition to whiteness. Drawing on Frantz Fanon's work on sociogeny, Wynter argues, just as Nietzsche does, that man performed a 'tremendous labor' on oneself to make oneself 'calculable', or 'responsible' on the basis of his 'conscience', as Nietzsche would call it.

(Nietzsche 1989, 58-60). This "calculation" of the description of Man was a dynamic of sociogeny which, and this is Wynter's other use of Nietzsche, "only by forgetting that he himself is an *artistically creating subject* [autopoiesis of the self], does man live with any repose, security, and consistency" (Nietzsche 2006, 119). That is, it is by forgetting the sociogenic construction of the self that it is possible to establish the fixity, and thus overrepresentation, of the category of Man. Both Wynter and Nietzsche argue, therefore, that sociogeny stands next to phylogeny and ontogeny and is their mediator. Nietzsche names 'conscience' as the consequence of Man's attempts at calculability and responsibility, but it is also this 'conscience' which determines this conscience as the only definition of what it means to be human. As such, Wynter's use of Nietzsche highlights the role that sociogeny plays in the construction of identity, stability, and fixity of the definition of the human.

Earlier it was argued that Nietzsche's account of 'bad conscience' was parallel to the Du Boisean 'double consciousness'. We may see now how sociogeny develops both parallel tracks in Nietzsche and Wynter, respectively. For Nietzsche, 'bad conscience' grew out of the creditor-debtor relationship which used pain as a tool for calculation and responsibility. Those who internalized this use of pain went on to develop feelings of guilt and shame about their own identity. These feelings of guilt and shame, however, were to define the sociogenic creation of 'bad conscience' since they grew from resentment latent in slave morality. Thus, Wynter's account of sociogeny helps reveal and clarify Nietzsche's own racism and his genealogy of 'bad conscience'. For, it is these same feelings of guilt and shame that Fanon identifies in the racialized inferiority-complexes of his patients. It was in *measuring themselves against their other* that they developed a 'bad conscience' or a 'double consciousness' of being both Black and a human. As Wynter notes, this creation of the sociogenically inscribed 'double consciousness' is the first step to a certain epistemic clarity which only comes from seeing through the lies of our naturalized metaphysical values of 'good and evil', 'good and bad', 'truth and lies'. In essence, if Nietzsche writes, "only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor can one live with any repose, security, and consistency" (Nietzsche 2006, 118), Wynter would counter with 'only by *remembering* this primitive world of metaphor' can we live with any authenticity, agency, and meaning.

Consequently, in Wynter, we see the project of the 'human being as praxis' become possible once one becomes full self-actualizing and autopoetically instituting the definition of what it means to be human; Wynter writes, "Human beings are magical. Bios and logos. Word made flesh, muscle and bone animated by hope and desire, belief materialized in deeds, deeds which crystallize our actualities." (Wynter 1995, 35) This conjunction of 'bios' and 'logos' reveals the truth of our sociogenic codes which allow us to overcome the hegemonic bio-economical model of the Man towards a new *defining* of the Human. It is not a *fixed* definition or a *stable* account of Man's calculability, but a continuous process of defining which never establishes a fixity of metaphysical principles upon which to build its epistemic construction. Instead, as Wynter notes, what must be fomented are 'cultures of actuality' or g-local epistemic enclosures which unsettle the hegemony of the overrepresented category of Man. These pockets of actuality reverse the priority of *theoria* to establish a determined referent or archē, and instead cultivate *praxis* through the *actualization* of the being of being human. Thus, instead of some fixed metaphysical origin of what it means to be human, Wynter offers a repose to such metaphysical animals by offering up a continually liminal and transgressive figure of the Human which unsettles the hegemony of Man² as the only definition of what it means to be human.

I would argue, therefore, that a certain epistemic clarity is needed to affect this 'human being as praxis' which can be boiled down to a seeing 'from the other side'. For Wynter, Blackness provides a privileged site of epistemic clairvoyance precisely because Blackness has been the ledger of epistemic contradictions and discursive falsities. Nietzsche concludes his second essay in *On the Genealogy of Morals* by writing that "bad conscience is an illness, there is no doubt about that, but an illness as pregnancy is an illness" (Nietzsche 1989, 88). He goes further on to say, "an attempt at the reverse would in itself be possible – but who is strong enough for it? – that is, to wed the bad conscience to all the unnatural inclinations, all those aspirations to the beyond, to that which runs counter to sense, instinct, nature, animal ... To whom should one turn today with such hopes and demands?" Nietzsche writes, "it would require, in brief and alas, precisely this *great health!* [...] This man of the future, who will redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism; [...]"

this Antichrist and antinihilist; this victor over God and nothingness – he must come one day" (Nietzsche 1989, 95-96). Thus, for Nietzsche, bad conscience is pregnant with the person who will come to be the great redeemer of great health who destroys these false ideals and overcomes the nihilism of modernity. Nietzsche writes, "the *aim* now is to turn back the concepts of 'guilt' and 'duty' – back against whom? There can be no doubt: against the debtor first of all [...] Finally, however, they are turned back against the 'creditor'" (Nietzsche 1989, 91). Thus, a double bind animates the overcoming of 'bad conscience'. One must first revolt against the self – come to terms with the sociogeny of our own creation – and then revolt against the oppressor – to reveal their desedimented metaphors and lies. This double-bind is crucial to understanding Wynter's own project of the human being as praxis, since the double-bind animates the Self/Other dichotomy which structures sociogeny: I see myself through how the other perceives me. Consequently, to overcome the double-bind of sociogeny is not to annihilate it, but to no longer allow it to control and master the individual through the displacement of agency. Just as Nietzsche argues that a certain strength is necessary for self-possession, a certain strength is necessary for fully assimilating the sociogeny of what it means to be; it is a process of self-actualization and realization which follows through on the epistemic clarity granted by double-consciousness. This is the 'gift' of 'second-sight': to see the double-bind of sociogeny. Thus, in some sense, Nietzsche's great redeemer must see through this second-sight. Nietzsche's great redeemer, provocatively, must be *Black*.

In this section, I have sought to demonstrate how Nietzsche's use in Wynter is not insignificant to her overall corpus. In fact, Nietzsche's citations are at integral and crucial moments on her discussion of sociogeny. Therefore, I followed this path through Nietzsche's work to clarify how 'bad/conscience' is a product of a proto-sociogeny latent in Nietzsche's work. This allowed us to see how the 'human being as praxis' became possible in Wynter and what it would mean for Nietzsche's own Great Redeemer. Now we will turn toward a unification of Nietzsche and Wynter through a reading of Reiner Schürmann's essay "Constituting Oneself and Anarchist" to understand how to carry out the radicalizations latent in both Wynter and Nietzsche. To constitute oneself an anarchist every day, therefore, will be a commitment to the project of the human being as praxis and a Nietzschean self-overcoming.

Concluding with Schürmann: Or, the Anarchy of Everyday Living

This section aims to answer the Schürmannian question "what am I to do?" with the answer "be anti-racist!". For Schürmann, the epochal question of modernity arrives shaped by his "hypothesis of the closure" of metaphysics – or the determination that the metaphysical enclosure has closed upon itself and withered away by the advent of technology. Thus, Schürmann's contribution to this essay is two-fold: one, his epochal genealogy of Western philosophy provides a deepening of the Wynter-Nietzsche couplet by excavating how the archē or First Principle of the epochal constellation legitimating discourse has been predicated upon the supreme referent of "Man"; two, Nietzsche's and Wynter's respective projects become clarified under this 'hypothesis of the closure' in the 'age of anarchy' as enacting a 'constitution' of oneself as anarchist. To be an anarchist in the closure and withering of metaphysical principles answers the question of "what should I do?" through the imposition of overcoming and withering the anti-Black principles of value and judgment which have sutured together the tapestry of discourse and action in Western modernity since Columbus' heretical voyage in 1492. As we will see in the conclusion of this section, overcoming the coloniality of Being and metaphysics entails a proliferation of metaphysical enclosures in the unsettling of the overrepresentation of Man1 and Man2.

Schürmann's philosophy benefits from a more Heideggerian inflection of Foucauldian insights. This does not mean, however, that he is immune from the same criticism we have leveled at Nietzsche through Wynter's work. In *Philosophy of Nietzsche*, Schürmann fails to consider Nietzsche's anti-Blackness as indicative of anything other than regretful sentiment. It does not even warrant a mention. As such, his reading of Nietzsche ushers forth from the contention that Nietzsche was integral to the withering of metaphysical principles (Schürmann 2019, 35). While this may be partially the case, we nevertheless have demonstrated how this anti-Blackness is legitimized on the basis of a metaphysical archē. As such, his account of Nietzsche remains still trapped within the enclosure of metaphysics. Furthermore, in his genealogy of Western epochal referents, he fails to consider what Anibal Quijano and Sylvia Wynter call the "coloniality of power/truth/being/freedom", or what I call the "coloniality of metaphysics". As such, Schürmann's account of the genealogy of discourse is an incomplete picture, of which we have been outlining in Wynter. Thus, as we will see, Schürmann's

hypothesis of the closure is still riveted to a 'monstrous site' of the overrepresentation of Man. It is this essay's contention, amongst others, that the hypothesis of the closure is likewise the hypothesis of the flourishing of metaphysical enclosures which unsettle the hegemonic monolith of Western metaphysics. That is, to posit a *singular* closure is to reinforce the hypothesis that there was only ever *one* metaphysical enclosure. In essence, it reifies the overrepresentation of man – and thus the coloniality of being and metaphysics is still operative – as the only genre or category of the human. To be an anarchist, then, is to live in an age of the multitude of metaphysical systems, or what Wynter calls the 'cultures of actuality'.

Schürmann's philosophy of 'hegemonic fantasms'¹⁴ argues that Western philosophy has been defined by economies of discourse and action which are oriented around a singular referent, *archē*, or First Principle. These 'hegemonic' referents legitimate all discourse and serve as the ground of and for praxis in their unquestioned legitimacy during the unfolding of their epochal constellation of presencing. For example, as Schürmann notes, "in the Greek context, this supreme postulate would be nature, in the Latin and Medieval epoch, God, and in the modern context it would be 'man, that passing postulate'" (Schürmann 2019, 9). These supreme postulates are "these points of ultimate moorage [which] provide legitimacy to the *principia*, the propositions held to be self-evident in the order of intelligibility." As such, these *archē* are not sempiternal. Instead, "we can trace the rise, the sway, and decline of a mode of presence so instituted by a First, that is, we can trace the *arche*, the origin as the founding act of an era" (Schürmann 2019, 33). For Wynter, Nietzsche, and Schürmann, the epochal referent of modernity was Man in all of its guises, despite its recent invention.

Schürmann's genealogy highlights the limit of the epochal enclosure through the category of Man. For, if Man is the supreme referent, then Man's Other surely marks the limit of the enclosure. That is, Blackness as Man's other in modernity is placed *outside* and *on the limn* of the epochal economy. It is through the *exclusion* of difference that an ontology of presence and presencing is possible. As Warren notes, Blackness became to stand in for 'nothingness' in the metaphysical discourse of the day (Warren 2018, 10). As such, a void encircles the epochal economy and is what stands in excess of signification. It is the

¹⁴ This is the name Schürmann gives to the epochal referents which order every episteme in *Broken Hegemonies*; "the history of hegemonic fantasms is the history of *ultimate* referents" (Schürmann 2003, 8).

'unsaid' of what is 'said' and 'done' through legitimization. Schürmann comes close to understanding the coloniality of being and metaphysics when he argues for the fixity and singularity of the archē which legitimizes all discourse and action. Thus, an ontological split animates Schürmann's conception of the epochal economy. It is the very same split we identified in Nietzsche's work as the split which both encircles history and pre-/non-history. These ontological splits divide the overrepresentation of Man between itself and its Other. Thus, subtending the epochal economy is an economy of Blackness which is forcibly controlled by the epochal economy of the age. This subtending economy is from whence the unsettling issues forth¹⁵. It has always been operative but occluded in the workings of the epochal economy. The latter obnubilates the former to ground itself in a self-legitimizing action. It is in this grounding of the abGrund of Being – the nothingness of Blackness – that demonstrates the fabrication of archē's in the epochal economy. That is, it is because these supreme referents are *constructed* that we can begin to understand the hypothesis of the closure.

Before commencing with a discussion on the hypothesis of the closure, I would like to briefly note that both Nietzsche and Wynter aim at unsettling the supreme referent of Man in their respective works according to Schürmann's own periodization. For Nietzsche, it is "by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor [that] one can live with any repose, security, and consistency.... If but for an instant he could escape from the prison walls of faith, his 'self-consciousness' would be immediately destroyed" (Nietzsche 2006, 119). That is to say, if Man forgot the fixity of metaphysical principles and their singularization could he realize that the fabrication of 'self-consciousness' was an illusion meant to conform to the epochal discourse of the time. Man is the 'original concept' and the 'original image' of nature. All conforms to the referent of Man. Nietzsche says, "all that we actually know about these laws of nature is what we ourselves bring to them" (Nietzsche 2006, 120). Thus, for Nietzsche, the metaphysical enclosure is but a silhouette of Man. The laws of nature and the norms of society are 'made calculable' by Man's own imposition as the centre of discourse. It is precisely this figure that both Nietzsche and Wynter seeks to 'unsettle' and 'overcome'.

For Wynter, it is by understanding the autopoetically instituted nature of our definition of who we are that we can come to understand a.) that humans

¹⁵ Wynter would call this the 'demonic ground of meaning'. For more SEE: (Wynter 1990, 356)

define themselves through narratological codes of Us/Them and b.) it is possible to deviate and unsettle the overrepresented category of Man to usher in a new age of the Human. Thus, for Wynter, the solution to overcoming the closure of metaphysics which takes as its referent only *one* genre of Man is to allow for the proliferation of the genres of the Human in a never-ending process of redefinition and re-inscription. Instead of supplanting the metaphysical grammar of subject-object – Man is X – with a redefinition, and thus a new singular referent, Wynter argues for a proliferation of metaphysical enclosures in what she calls "cultures of actuality". These cultures of actuality allow for a multitude of existences and modalities of being. Thus, for Wynter, she radicalizes the Nietzschean project beyond its attempts to institute a new definition of becoming by allowing for the proliferation of becoming in cultures of actuality. She writes, "but beyond our now global and hegemonic 'understanding of man's humanity'[.] we will understand that our present behavior motivational constructs and their 'programming language [epochal referents] ... are no more 'true' outside our present variant culture's 'ground' of actuality" (Wynter 1995, 34-35). Thus, Wynter establishes the contextuality of the 'ground' of actuality as being specific to both its epochal referent and the Eurocentrism predicated upon it. The task, then, will be to think these cultures of actuality away from the overrepresentation of the epochal referent of Man as the *only* referent possible. In sum, Wynter offers a pluralization and a non-hegemonic account of ontological difference between Being as the referent, and beings as the presences of Being.

We may see, then, how Wynter marks a delineation between Schürmann and Nietzsche. If, as Schürmann says, "we have more to gain from the hastening the withering away of what I will call epochal principles than from attempts at their resuscitation", then Nietzsche's anti-Black racism is a resuscitation of the archē of anti-Blackness (Schürmann 2019, 34). And furthermore, if Schürmann wants "the deconstruction of the historical constellations of presence [to] thus [show] that once can speak of the closed unity of the metaphysical epoch [in] at least one respect: the concern with deriving a practical or moral philosophy from first philosophy", then "it is a systematic closure, inasmuch as the norms of action formally 'proceed from' the corresponding first philosophies, and it is an historical closure, because the deconstructionist discourse can arise only from the boundary of the era over which it is exercised" (Schürmann 2019, 42-43). But, nevertheless,

Schürmann's liminal account of constituting oneself anarchist at the limits of society fails to take into account of the coloniality of power, being, and metaphysics. Instead, as we have noted in Wynter, the hypothesis of the closure must obtain for the overcoming of its *monolingualism*. The withering of metaphysical principles is not a withering of their condition of possibility, but a withering of the condition of possibility which secured its monological functioning. It is a withering of *first* philosophy as the *only* first philosophy. To argue that the hypothesis of the closure is about metaphysics writ large is to reify the trap of coloniality that being is monolithic and hegemonic. Thus, as an amelioration of Schürmann, we may conclude that the hypothesis of the closure – of which constituting oneself an anarchist is precipitated by – is a hypothesis of the closure and withering of the *overrepresentation of epochal referents as the only referent*. In this sense, Schürmann's philosophy can be adequately said to consider a robust theory of power which includes internal discourses of power to the West and the coloniality of power.

"What am I to do?", asks Schürmann. He responds by saying in "Constituting Oneself an Anarchist Subject":

What emerges as the gesture of a self-constitution that is possible today is the polymorphous fight against social totalities. "The whole of society' is precisely that which should not be considered except as something to be destroyed". The struggles mentioned are 'anarchistic struggles'. What makes them such is not only the intended break-up of totalities, but more essentially still their polymorphous, sporadic, 'transversal', 'immediate' nature. (Schürmann 2019, 27)

Thus, to constitute oneself an anarchist is, as we have seen, to contest the overrepresentation of Man with the polymorphous social totality, and to transverse the limits of epochal economies in a transgressive way which overcomes the modern illusion of the autonomous, self-mastering subject, i.e. self-mastery is no longer a transgressive legislation of the self. In this way, Schürmann and Wynter leave behind Nietzsche. For it was Nietzsche who argued that self-mastering through a redemption of Great Health becomes an integral strategy for overcoming the 'morality of mores'. Against this, I would argue that the 'transversal' and 'polymorphous' nature of being an anarchist today is only possible in the multitude of metaphysics discussed previously in the proliferation of 'cultures of actuality'. It is through this proliferation that the polymorphous and sociogenic quality of our consciousness becomes anarchist. That is, it is by traversing multiple cultures of actuality, by existing at multiple nodal

points of demonic being that we become truly anarchist. This interstitial approach to anarchy reveals a possibility for the blossoming of a thousand cultures of actuality who are "without why"; that is, they are without a certain predication of being: to constitute oneself as a 'human being as praxis' is to overcome the subject-object predication of the definition of being. By transversing numerous ontologies and enclosures the sociogeny of being becomes clarified and elevated such that metaphysical pronouncements like anti-Blackness become mute. That is, to be an anarchist is to be anti-anti-Black, to be anti-racist. In short, racism is one of the last metaphysical remnants still operative in the hypothesis of the enclosure. Overcoming racism, therefore, is overcoming metaphysics in the age of anarchy. To be anti-racist is to be anarchist.

To conclude, we have sought to detail the use of Schürmann's philosophy for the purposes of constituting oneself an anarchist today in the age of the closure of metaphysics as a summation of the project of this essay. We saw how his philosophy failed to consider the coloniality of power, metaphysics, and being and was ameliorated to rework the 'hypothesis of the closure'. This allowed us to incorporate Wynter's insight into the coloniality of being and power in the realm of metaphysics as being predicated upon the archē of anti-Blackness. As such, overcoming the subject-object predication of Being with Man entailed a withering of the epochal principles of modernity. This allowed for the possibility of what I have called the metaphysics of the multitude or the multitude of metaphysics as the proliferation of cultures of actuality from which to affect a new possibility of praxis and being human. Praxis and being became modal and polymorphous to reflect the possibility and project of anarchy today. To constitute oneself an anarchist is to constitute oneself an anti-racist. This is the hypothesis of the closure of metaphysics in the contemporary. The hypothesis of the closure, therefore, is also the closure of the labyrinth of metaphysics and the successful navigation out of it by Ariadne's thread.

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